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What is Man, that You are Mindful of him?
The Harmony of Substance Dualism and MBTI
Reilly LaRose
Dr. Seeman – Philosophy of Mind
November 20, 2020
Introduction
The fad and fascination of human personality is easily noticed after a cursory journey of
the internet. Such enterprises can seem childish or unfounded, but many believe human
personality contains truths worth discovering. Do such truths actually exist? One method of
personality classification is the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (or MBTI). My intent is to merge
an analysis of MBTI and substance dualism within philosophy of mind in order to draw
harmonious connections and explanatory power between both theories and disciplines. This
analysis is not exhaustive, but if successfully constructed will lay down the fundamentals of a
conceptual and philosophical union between both MBTI and substance dualism.
Myers-Briggs and Jungian terms – the cognitive functions
In order to adequately explore the philosophical similarities and harmonies the MyersBriggs personality typology and substance dualism share, I’ll start with some fundamental
assertions of Carl Jung and the Myers-Briggs system, as well as some basic premises of mindbody dualism.
Carl Jung, the father of personality typology, wrote extensively on the “type problem” in
his sixth volume aptly titled Psychological Type. Jung aimed to analyze history and philosophy
to notice trends or categories of human psyche. Though this was later developed into the MyersBriggs Type Index, Jung’s groundwork simply established that certain basic types exist. Case
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examples of historical figures that Jung read and analyzed were early church fathers, such as
Origen and Tertullian, medieval philosophers like Duns Scotus and Radbertus, as well as
Immanuel Kant. In each case, philosophical and ideological disagreements amongst men and
women were seated within roots of psychology and personality type, according to Jung. He
noticed that the way a Christ-follower responds to Hellenism and the Greek philosophies
constituted a difference of personality. Both Tertullian and Origen’s personalities produced
different responses which lead to disagreements of doctrinal theology. What Jung ultimately
concluded as the dichotomy to explain behavior and thought between the two (and various case
examples thereafter) is the introvert and extravert, with Tertullian being the introvert and Origen
the extravert.1
The current cultural understanding of introversion and extraversion differs from Jung’s.
For Jung, these cognitive attitudes, as he refers to them, refer to one’s preference to the inner life
or the outer life. In his words, “when orientation by the object predominates in such a way that
decisions and actions are determined not by subjective views but by objective conditions, we
speak of an extraverted attitude. When this is habitual, we speak of an extraverted type. If a man
thinks, feels, acts, and actually lives in a way that is directly correlated with the objective
conditions and their demands, he is extraverted.”2 The introvert would clearly be the opposite,
where no matter the “objective conditions,” their behavior is directed by internal perceptions and
subjective views of the object in question.

1

Jung, C. G., Read, H., Fordham, M., & Adler, G (1953), (16, 20).

2

Jung, C. G., Read, H., Fordham, M., & Adler, G (1953), (333).

3

An introvert will prefer to expend more psychological energy and resources in the inner selfexperience of an object while the extravert will funnel more into the object of experience itself.
What is key is that both are valid ways of cognitive structure and experience, and that everyone
falls into one or other at a higher rate than the alternative. Thus, the emergence of a preference
can be seen as a measure of personality within individuals. It is on this basis that Jung’s notion of
cognitive attitudes develops into personality.
The next discovery Jung makes is that of function types. Within each psyche there is the
bend toward introversion or extraversion, but Jung also saw particular functions of the mental
life as being dichotomies of measurable personality traits. The four, in particular, he noticed
were that of sensation, intuition, thinking, and feeling. Sensation is the capacity for perception of
sense-datum, intuition the capacity for perception of conceptual datum, thinking the capacity for
reason or rational judgment, and feeling as the capacity for emotive or irrational judgment. Thus,
we have two perceiving functions (data collection functions) and two judging functions
(meaning-imbuing functions). Combined with cognitive attitudes, Jung’s theory leads to eight
unique cognitive functions: introverted sensing, extraverted sensing, introverted intuition,
extraverted intuition, introverted thinking, extraverted thinking, introverted feeling, and
extraverted feeling. Every person, or unified self, has a dominant preference towards one of these
dichotomies in a noticeable way. This is the idea of the “dominant” function.
These dichotomies within persons are not just observations of quirks or tendencies, for
Jung, but real and substantial factors fundamental to human personality. Jung writes this in
Volume 6, “There is no possibility, therefore, of finding any satisfactory, reconciling formula by
pursuing the one or the other attitude. And yet, even if his mind could, man cannot remain thus
divided, for the split is not a mere matter of some off-beat philosophy, but the daily repeated
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problem of his relation to himself and to the world.”3 His observation of history and philosophy
reveal that personality and psychological type have an integral role to play in the way people
perceive the world and themselves.
Substance dualism, under the Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, can be understood as
affirming “a substance is characterized by its properties, but…it is more than the collection of the
properties it possesses; it is the thing which possesses them. So, the mind is not just a collection
of thoughts but is that which thinks - an immaterial substance over and above its immaterial
states.”4 The roots of substance dualism are seated in a metaphysic which argues for the
existence of both a physical body and immaterial mind within humans. When one refers to the
mind, they are not merely pointing to the effects of the material substrate that make up the brain
(though the immaterial could feasibly be “found” or “bound” to the brain). Further, when
speaking of the body, one isn’t simply referring to the extension of mind as perceived by the
subject (a denial of idealism). At base, there are two substances (maybe more) in existence, and
humans are constituted by both. Many philosophers point out this unification of body and soul
can be understood as a marriage of substances to accomplish beauty and purpose. This union
doesn’t downplay the intimacy and interaction of both substances, nor does it deny that both
substances are distinct.
I assert that without substance dualism, MBTI is incomplete and fits poorly within
philosophy of mind, given alternative theories like Idealism and Materialism. The structure of
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the paper will focus on the four functions types under Jung’s work as the landscape for my core
claims. With substance dualism, the Myers-Briggs system can argue for:
1. The existence and mental impact of the physical body.
2. The ability and unity of abstractions and conscious life.
3. The existence of both an inner and outer world (phenomenologically and
metaphysically).
4. More conscious and less conscious mental properties according to personality.
5. The existence and place of reason in the mind and the external world.

Sensation – Investigations of the Bodily Self
To begin I will explain the sensing functions and how they relate the body and mind together.
Put plainly, the sensing functions are concerned with the collection and cataloguing of sensedatum for the body’s needs. Extraverted sensing directs attention to the actual sensory datum,
including the five senses, while introverted sensing receives information about “impressions” on
the body of such datum, like memory or hunger or muscle tension. Again, looking at the
inward/outward divide, these two functions accomplish concrete goals for the individual in a
conscious or unconscious way.
Under the Myers-Briggs system, a human “personality” is one with four cognitive functions
in a specific order. A person who is healthy or developed cognitively will display the abilities
and benefits of sensation, intuition, thinking, and feeling each with a cognitive attitude directed
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either inwardly or outwardly. 5 The fact this arrangement exists is the point I want to belabor
because the Myers-Briggs system, and Jung’s writings, makes clear that the more “dominant” a
function the more conscious it is to the individual. 6 Jung put it this way: “in other words, the
superior function is the most conscious one and completely under conscious control, whereas the
less differentiated are in part unconscious and far less under control of consciousness.” 7
The significance of MBTI and Jung’s theories in the claims I’m making is that if mental life
disperses across one’s consciousness in varied phenomenal ways, such experiences point to truth
and are functional truth-oriented mental properties only if an external world and internal world
actually exist. Beyond the phenomenal realm, MBTI has little to say; the theory provides
concepts to explain how the human person perceives and understands reality. What is needed is
a philosophy of what reality is outside the perceiver. Admitted within this framework of
psychological experience is that such experience arrives at the individual mentally. Again, a
philosophy of what that mind is must be attached or the theory explains nothing.
The substance dualist understanding of mind gives MBTI the best footing forward in
achieving its explanatory goals. With substance dualism, we affirm both the physical world and
the mental, allowing us to claim an external/internal divide in the person’s experience.
Additionally, the mind’s nature being that of a different substance from the body creates the
space for MBTI to postulate behavior outside of physical determinism, for if psychology is
simply a physical process, then the notion of personality is reducible to or better explained by
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physics and biology. The attaching of substance dualism is what best explains and creates
conceptual space for MBTI to make philosophically meaningful claims.
It has been my experience that individuals live in various levels of “attunement” to their
body, like coordination or knowledge of their bodily experience; yet such varying degrees never
outright displace the body from the person’s mental life. What seems to be captured in both
substance dualism and Myers-Briggs is the relationship between the body and soul – a meshing
that makes consciousness capable of abstraction and thinking through the perceptual organs and
phenomenal experience associated with embodiment. But in what sense can I call myself a
unified “self” if my body isn’t my whole being?
In his work Substance Dualism: the Best Account of the Unity of Consciousness, J. P.
Moreland classifies three types of unified consciousness: (1) objectual phenomenal unity, or the
unified experience of objects as we perceive them, (2) subject phenomenal unity, or the
unification of my inner experience as such, and (3) subsumptive phenomenal unity, or the
hierarchy of one, enduring “self” over and above both of these other kinds of consciousness. 8
Essentially, why is it that you are not the collection of your phenomenal parts? On what
theoretical grounds do we have the right to say there is an enduring or transcendent self beyond
the phenomenal experiences our brain collects at any given time? Under materialism, Moreland
argues the best explanation one has is that the synchronicity or the similar timing of our
phenomenal experiences is what creates a sense of this “self” that experiences everything above.
This clearly cannot be sufficiently explanatory, to Moreland, and I agree. Myers-Briggs seems to
agree, as well, that the self is not strictly the collection of four functions vying for control of the
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conscious; rather a unified self exists over and above each of these consciousnesses and bodily
experiences. For Moreland, substance dualism offers the best explanation of these three kinds of
unified consciousness and the implications that come with them. 9 Because there is an enduring
soul melded intimately with the body, the stimulations of the body coalesce into various inputs
that the soul or mind sits over and above to experience and make decisions over. For MyersBriggs, the bodily collection of this sense-datum and the overall physical experience of the
conscious being is found within the mental energy that flows inward or outward according to
each personality. Each person either tends to be transfixed on the body’s experience as such or
with the internal impressions and subjective views of such stimuli. These assertions lose meaning
if materialism or idealism is true, for the relationship between mind and body is haphazard at
best and, at worst, illusory or eliminated.
Intuition – Beyond the Physical Self
It is interesting to note that the debate of nominalism and realism toward universals was the
subject of much of Jung’s writings in his work of personality type. He characterizes the
disagreements of ideas amongst medieval writers as wrapped up in psychological differences of
type where the nominalists featured extraverted attitudes and the realists displayed introverted
attitudes.10 The point he draws from such an analysis and claim is that personality types and their
implications are not mere academic theorizing: “the two types [Rationalist/Empiricist] are
opposed in a remarkable way: the one shapes the material out of his own unconscious idea and
thus comes to experience; the other lets himself be guided by the material which contains his
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unconscious projection and thus comes to the idea. There is something intrinsically irritating
about this conflict of attitude, and, at bottom, it is the cause of the most heated and futile
scientific discussions.”11
It doesn’t seem outlandish to agree with Jung and affirm that mental experience and
causation accounts for a great deal of the disagreements persons have with each other and these
disagreements shape the world in a very real sense. By upholding the existence of mind and
body, their union, and its effects on human experience, Myers-Briggs and substance dualism
offer an attractive way of explaining and understanding ourselves and the world, because
together the mind-body union is the basis for personality traits. Because that union has effects on
human experience, we can observe how the body stimulates mental life by allowing abstraction
of particulars into generals (whether they exist in their own right or not).
Mental life, itself, is variegated and painfully unique for all persons, which needs to be
accounted for in any account of philosophy of mind. According to Douglass Wilde, Jung’s work
on functions and attitudes never meant to describes types of persons, rather the classifications
that Myers-Briggs and Jung assert are types of consciousness and, admittedly, individuals go
through various forms of consciousness throughout their entire life. 12 Combining substance
dualism and Myers-Briggs may provide a more nuanced explanation of how mind interacts with
body to produce unique behavior and thought within individuals. The problem of interaction has
plagued dualism since Descartes formalized the theory, so if substance dualism and Myers-

11

Jung, C. G., Read, H., Fordham, M., & Adler, G (1953), (311).

12

Wilde, D. J. (10) (2014). Jung's personality theory quantified.

10

Briggs work together to work from a psychological perspective, analysis of the categorical and
unique attributes and structure of human personality would be possible. Such theoretical and
empirical work could establish more specifically and clearly how the mind and body might
interact within the wholly unified person since the union produces traits that affect human
thought and behavior.
Thinking – the Seat of Reason
We move now to the judging functions, beginning with thinking. Which revolves around
making judgments and assessing behavior and thought based on justifiable, rational criteria. For
Jung, reason is “the capacity to be reasonable, a definite attitude that enables us to think, feel,
and act in accordance with objective values. From an empirical standpoint, these objective values
are the product of experience, but from the ideological standpoint they are the result of a positive
act of rational evaluation…” 13 What we see within the Myers-Briggs system of personality, then,
is an account and space for reason to be developed and nuanced within human experience and
concepts. In turn, substance dualism offers the best account for reason’s place in the mental life.
In his work, On What We Must Think, Ralph C. S. Walker argues from a dualistic perspective
towards an account of reason and human behavior while showing the pitfalls and problems with
materialistic accounts of reason. In a combination of claims and conclusions, Walker states that
on the basis of reason, the mental cannot solely be the physical. Assuming physical determinism,
the belief that all physical events, properties, and states are explained by antecedent events,
properties, or states, reason provides sufficient justification to believe the mind is not physical

13

Jung, C. G., Read, H., Fordham, M., & Adler, G (1953), (308,309).

11

since the process of reason interrupts the chain of physical determinism. In his view, Walker
can’t conceptualize how reason would “fit” in the spatiotemporal order; isn’t it flawed to state
that reason would “take up space and time”? Really, what reason does is “moves minds” towards
certain ideas and behavior. In this way, no matter our physical being, should reason exist
ontologically, then no conception of mind remains within the bounds of physical determinism
solely: there must be a mental outside the physical to be moved by reason.14 Of course, one could
deny physical determinism (conceding a dualist perspective, or at least a non-materialist one), or
ironically deny that reason exists, or to deny that reason moves the mind. It’s clear I reject the
notion of a physicalist causal closure, where everything has physical causes only, and I also hold
that reason exists. The claim that reason moves the mind towards certain conclusions or
judgments is certainly a perspective one could challenge semantically, but reason would lack any
real explanatory power or ontological state if we deny it affects the mind. To devalue reason
seems unnecessary and sour to me since how one goes about living such a belief out is
nonsensical. Any conclusion or judgment one arrives at cannot truly be called an effect of reason
and deserves other explanations. Substance dualism and MBTI both push us to embrace the
relationship between mental causes and effects from reason by virtue of the functional ability of
humans to reason.
Myers-Briggs seems to accommodate this line of reasoning. The assertion that the mind is
moved by the mental aligns with what Jung expressed as the attribute of being reasonable.
Further, having a separate, mental existence sets one up to subscribe to an enduring self beyond
the physical. Here, Walker offers some more insight into substance dualism’s explanatory power.
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Concerning identity, Walker worries that the divisibility of one’s identity is not sufficiently taken
seriously outside of a substance dualist perspective. If materialism is true, then some other
attribute or quality must be offered as the vessel of mind; Walker, however, sees problems with
this: “if we think that the identity of a person, or a mind, consists in anything other than identity
itself, it will always be possible that at some point the person, or the mind, should divide leaving
two persons or minds, both equally qualified to count as the same person or mind.” 15 What
Walker rightly points out is that if my identity is found in some physical attribute, structure, or
state I am in, what stops my identity from being malleable beyond the point of a unified self?
Surely, the unified self must exist long enough to finish thoughts and sentences, but beyond that,
what confidence do we have that our identity is anything close to being unified? In what way can
we even talk of enduring persons, personality, or character? It seems that there “must be
something that unites particular perceptions and we cannot but think of that something as the
subjective self. (emphasis added)” 16
Reason within a substance dualist framework and reason within a Myers-Briggs/Jungian
framework appear to harmonize. Because of substance dualism’s justification for an enduring
self and the strong sense of reason, the MBTI can make claims of human personality that
manifest in the exercise of reason.
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Feeling – a defense of emotion
I have very little to add to our analysis of substance dualism and Myers-Briggs with the
feeling functions, but it revolves around qualia and relevant musings in philosophy of mind.
The introspective and expressivist powers of emotion are staggering. When one says each
person is “a world unto themselves,” they do not speak in arbitrariness or nonsense. Within
humanity exists capacities to empathize, mourn, adore, and even play with experiences and other
persons in ways that can only be called irrational. The Myers-Briggs system seeks to
conceptualize feeling as that which imbues or defines meaning for an individual according to
non-rational principles. These can be affections or aversions, loves or hates, mourning and
rejoicing all in relation to the object. Substance dualism holds a simple and profound answer for
these observations of conscious life: the soul, the mind, the self is that which feels. We are more
than the collection of qualitative phenomenal experiences, but that which experiences them.
Concluding thoughts
The last defense of both Myers-Briggs and substance dualism before my concluding
thoughts will draw on Riccardo Manzotti and Paolo Moderato’s work Neuroscience: Dualism in
Disguise. What both authors seek to do is hold the discipline of neuroscience to their word as
being the “forthcoming mindscience,” 17 and evaluate what sort of philosophical claims are being
held in esteem within the field. The conclusion they arrive at is that neuroscience, while peddling
a materialistic explanation of mind in most cases, tacitly or implicitly holds a dualistic
philosophy of mind: “nothing in the literature explains why a certain neural phenomenon should
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produce a certain phenomenal experience. The evidence so far collected is just brute data.
Neuroscience faces an impossible mission…showing how a physical world which had been a
priori defined as devoid of those properties that are essential of mind may contain or produce
those properties.”18 What Manzotti and Moderato call this situation is an “ontological promissory
note” of explanation, meaning that neuroscientists who hold materialist views can only promise
that someday the cashing out of explanation for mind in physical terms and causes will be
realized. All the while, a dualistic conception of mind and body is guiding the language and
practice of neuroscience, for what a materialist calls “mental properties” doesn’t elude the
problems associated with materialism and mind. As Manzotti and Moderato put it, these “mental
properties” function the same as a dualist’s “mental qualities” in philosophical terms. Both are
treated as things in themselves and inexplicable from the perspective of pure physicalism.
I posit a similar situation of “ontological promissory notes” in the Myers-Briggs system.
Should substance dualism be untrue, how could one make sense of the philosophical and
conceptual claims of “cognitive functions” or personality as such beyond the structuralist or
behaviorist accounts we already have today? If the forthcoming “mindscience” is running off an
implicit dualistic understanding of humanity and mind, consistency should be sought after, and
such claims ought to be expressed. Substance dualism, in my view, accounts for commendable
amount of phenomena and problems in philosophy of mind and sets the stage for a theory of
personality like Myers-Briggs to have explanatory power and offer insights into human
personality like the constitution and traits of the mind.
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What I hope to have accomplished up to this point is show the vast similarities in theory
and philosophical claims between Myers-Briggs personality typology/Jungian typology and
substance dualism within philosophy of mind. The various claims that both MyersBriggs/Jungian typology and substance dualism affirm together include:
1) The existence and mental impact of the physical body.
2) The ability and unity of abstractions and conscious life.
3) The existence of both an inner and outer world (phenomenologically and
metaphysically).
4) More conscious and less conscious mental properties according to personality.
5) The existence and place of reason in the mind and the external world.
There is much more I wish I could have done for this paper, but my vision for both the
Myers-Briggs/Jungian typology and for substance dualism is a mutually beneficial union. Each
fill in details the other isn’t equipped to handle or sets out to accomplish in the first place. A
theory and discipline around the qualitative (and perhaps quantitative19) content of human
cognitive traits seems promising and novel for the substance dualist to better explain and account
for what mind actually does within the human union, while MBTI needs a philosophy of mind
before it can philosophically claim explanatory power. All in all, research and enthusiasm are
deserved for both of these out-of-fashion theories. “One sees what one can best see oneself.” 20

19

Wilde, D. J. (10) (2014). Jung's personality theory quantified.

20

Jung, C. G., Read, H., Fordham, M., & Adler, G (1953), (9).

16

Work Cited

Drenth, A. J. (n.d.). The 8 functions. Retrieved November 21, 2020, from
https://personalityjunkie.com/myers-briggs-functions-inferior-function/

Drenth, A. J. (n.d.). The "Functional Stack" (Typology 301). Retrieved November 21, 2020,
from https://personalityjunkie.com/functional-stack-type-dynamics-theory/

Jung, C. G., Read, H., Fordham, M., & Adler, G. (1953). The collected works of C.G. Jung (Vol.
6). New York: Pantheon Books.

Manzotti, R., & Moderato, P. (2014). Neuroscience: Dualism in Disguise. In 1071525119
815305034 A. Lavazza & 1071525120 815305034 H. Robinson (Authors), Contemporary
dualism: A defense (pp. 83-92). New York: Routledge.

Moreland, J. P. (2019). Substance Dualism: The Best Account of the Unity of Consciousness. In
1071434001 815250492 M. P. Guta (Author), Consciousness and the ontology of
properties (pp. 86-102). New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

Robinson, H. (2020, September 11). Dualism. Retrieved November 21, 2020, from
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/

Walker, R. C. (2014). On What We Must Think. In 1071485587 815281407 A. Lavazza &
1071485588 815281407 H. Robinson (Authors), Contemporary dualism: A defense (pp.
172-186). New York: Routledge.

17

Wilde, D. J. (2014). Jung's personality theory quantified. Place of publication not identified:
Springer.

